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1. INTRODUCTION 
Australia's  inflation rate has been high  since the early  1970's, both 
in  absolute  terms  and  relative  to  the  other  developed  market 
economies.'  Although the costs of  this inflation  have been  difficult 
to  quantify,  most  economists  and  policy  makers  agree  that 
decreasing  the  rate  of  inflation  ought  to  be  one  of  the  leading 
priorities for macroeconomic policy. 
In  this  paper,  we  aim  to  analyze  Australia's  inflation  rate  from 
three  perspectives.  First,  we  examine  the  contributions  of  four 
factors  -  the  growth  rates  of  money,  nominal  wages  and 
productivity,  and  world  inflation  -  to  inflation  in  the  short-term. 
Second, we examine the  contributions of  these  factors  to  the  long- 
term  (equilibrium) inflation  rate.  Third, we  investigate  how  inuch 
inertia  there  is  in  the  inflation  rate,  i.e.  whether  inflation  can 
deviate from  its  equilibrium rate  for  a  significant  period  of  time. 
For  comparative  purposes,  we  similarly  examine  inflation  in 
Australia's  four  major  trading  partners:  Japan,  the  United  States, 
the United  Kingdom and New Zealand. 
Over  the period  1973-1989 Australian  and OECD  average annual inflation 
rates  (measured  by  the CPI)  were 9.7 percent  and 7.7  percent,  respectively. 
In  terms  of  GDP(GNP)  deflators,  they  were  10.0  percent  and  6.6  per  cent 
respectively.  (Sources: OECD Main Economic Indicators, Australian  Bureau of 
Statistics Catalogue Nos. 6401.0 and 6442.0) 
Carmichael  (1990)  provides  an  extensive  overview  of  inflation  in  Australia 
during the 1980's. We  intend  particularly  to  examine  the  importance  of  aggregate 
wage  growth  in the  determination of  price  inflation.  The  control 
of  wage  inflation  has always assumed  a  great  deal of  importai~ce 
in the  making  of  Australian  economic  policy,  often because  of  its 
perceived  influence  in restraining price  inflation  (Milbourne  1990). 
In  recent  years  this  argument has been  used  as  one  of  the  chief 
justifications  for  the centralized wages system.  Recently,  however, 
the  costs  of  this  system  viz.  the  reduced  flexibility  of  relative 
wages,  have  received  greater  recognition  and  some  steps  have 
been  taken  towards a  deregulated  wages system.  Such a  system, 
however,  necessarily  implies  that  policy  makers  will  lose  some 
(perhaps all) direct control over aggregate wage outcomes. 
This would not  necessarily  be  an adverse development,  of  course, 
provided  goods  and  factor  markets  are  competitive  and  clear 
continuously,  i.e.  prices  in  all  markets  are  flexible.  Under  these 
circumstances,  allocative  efficiency  suggests that  the relative  prices 
of  various  types  of  labour  ought  to  be  determined  by  relative 
scarcities,  with  the  aggregate  wage  outcome  of  no  more 
macroeconomic  importance  than,  say,  the  aggregate  peanut  price 
outcome.  Control  of  inflation  can be  achieved  by  control  of  an 
appropriate nominal quantity, such as the supply of  money. 
In  practice,  however,  markets  do  not  commonly  reflect  this 
competitive  ideal.  Wages  are  often  determined  by  bargains 
between  unions  and  firm.  Relative  wage  outcomes,  even  when 
market  determined,  are  often  influenced  by  such  irritating 
considerations  as  perceived  fairness  (Akerlof  and  Yellen  1990), 
while prices in imperfectly competitive markets will be determined 
as markups over  costs  (Blanchard and  Fischer  1989, pp. 465-468). 
Under  these  circumstances, we  have  to  ask whether  a  satisfactory 
outcome  for  price  inflation  can  be  delivered  when  goods  and factor  markets  do not  function  perfectly  and  when  policy  makers 
have little or no control over the growth of  aggregate wages. 
Previous  studies of  Australian  inflation  have  found  wage  growth 
to  be  an  important  determinant  of  price  inflation.  Carmichael 
(1974)  constructs  a  model  of  inflation  from  micro-foundations, 
with  a  reduced  form  inflation  equation  estimated  with  quarterly 
data  over  the  period  1960(1)-1973(3).  This  study  finds  labour 
productivity,  world  tradable prices  and  expected  wage  growth to 
all exert significant effects on inflation. 
Nevile  (1977)  models  the  growth  rate  of  the  GNE  deflator  in 
Australia  using  annual data  for  the period  of  1954/55  to  1973/74. 
He  finds  award  wage  growth,  inflation  expectations  and  excess 
demand to be significant determinants of  the inflation rate. 
Boehm  (1984)  investigates  Granger  causality  between  wages 
growth and inflation  in  ~ustralia.~  Using quarterly  data over  the 
period  1954-82,  Boehm  finds  Granger  causation  from  wages  to 
prices,  but  not  vice  versa.  Alston  and  Chalfant  (1987)  extend 
Boehm's  bivariate  study by  including  money  supply  (MI) growth 
in  their  model and  find lagged  money  supply growth to  Granger- 
cause  wage  growth  and  inflation,  and  challenge  Boehm's 
conclusion  that  wage  growth  causes  price  inflation.  Their 
preferred  interpretation  of  the  data  is  that  the  causal  links  run 
from  money  to  wages  and  money  to  prices  with  different  time 
lags. 
While  the  determinants  of  Australian  inflation  have  been  studied 
A  variable x  is  said  to  Granger cause another  variable y  if,  in  a regression 
of y  on lagged values of  both x and y, the coefficients on those lagged values 
of  x  are jointly  significantly different from zero. extensively,  we  are  not  aware  of  any  previous  work  that  has 
examined  the  degree  of  inertia  in  Australia's  inflation  rate.  This 
stands in  contrast  to  studies of  inflation  in  other  countries where 
the inertia  issue has received  some attention.  Gordon (1985) finds 
lagged inflation  to be  a significant determinant of  US  inflation.  In 
a  recent  study  Gordon  (1990) examines  inflation  in  the  US,  UK, 
Japan, France  and Germany  over  the  period  1873-1987.  He finds 
the  emergence of  considerable inertia  in  the  last  three decades for 
all countries except Japan. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as follows.  In  Section  2  we 
derive  a  structural  model  of  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate,  and 
discuss  dynamics  which  take  into  account  possible  inertia  ill  the 
adjustment  of  prevailing  inflation  to  its  equilibrium  rate.  In 
Section  3  we  examine  the  exogeneity  of  money  and  nominal 
wages.  Evidence  pertaining  to  the  short-term  determinants  of 
inflation  is  presented  in  Section  4.  In  Section  5  we  report  the 
results  from  the  estimation  of  our  dynamic  model  of  the 
equilibrium inflation rate and draw some implications for policy  in 
Section 6. 
2.  THE  STRUCTURAL MODEL: SPECIFICATION 
(i) The Equilibrium Inflation Rate 
The  equilibrium  inflation  rate  is  determined  by  the  following 
three-equation  structural model,  with  all  the  variables,  except  the 
nominal interest rate, i, specified as natural logarithms. Equation  (1) shows output, y,  to decrease  as the real  interest  rate 
increases and to increase as the real exchange rate depreciates.  To 
abstract  from nominal  exchange  rate  effects,  foreign  prices,  q,  are 
measured  in  units  of  the  domestic  currency.  Equation  (2)  is  an 
equilibrium  condition  for  the  money  market.  Equation  (3) is  an 
aggregate  supply function,  with  the  price  level  p  increasing  with 
output  and  the  nominal  wage  level,  w,  and  decreasing  with  the 
level of  (total factor) productivity, z. 
These equations can be re-arranged to show that 
where  v1  = 61al/(~2+~l~1+~1(~1~2+~l+~2~2)) 
A 
The  expression for  the equilibrium inflation rate,  7tt,  is  derived by 
noting  that  Etpt+l  =  Et7ttcl  +  pt,  making  the  simplifying 
assumption that Etnt+l  = E  t-l 7t  and taking first differences of  (4): where  hl  = v1/(1-v2) 
and where ' above a variable denotes a growth rate. 
Since v2 < 1, the equilibrium inflation rate covaries positively with 
the growth rates of  money, nominal wages and foreign prices and 
negatively with productivity growth.  ho is a constant.  Estimation 
of  the  parameters  in  (5) should yield  the relative  contributions of 
these variables to the equilibrium inflation rate. 
In  a  recent  review  of  the  inflation  literature,  McCallum  (1990) 
observes  that  there  is  little  professional  disagreement  nowadays 
with  Milton  Friedman's  dictum  that  "inflation  is  always  and 
everywhere  a  monetary  phenomenon"  (1963  p17),  provided  that 
one abstracts from the  effects on inflation of  supply shocks, which 
are  assumed  to  be  temporary  and  of  relatively  small  magnitude. 
Strictly  speaking, however,  the  correct  statement  is  that  "inflation 
is  a  phenomenon  of  the  economy's  exogenous  nominal  variable". 
This  variable  is  assumed  by  quantity  theorists  (like Friedman) to 
be  money  since, in  principle, it  is  under  the control of  the  central 
bank.  Given  this  assumption,  the  paths  of  all  other  nominal 
variables,  including wages,  are  determined  by  the  growth  rate  of 
the money supply. The validity of  this assumption is determined by  the  nature of  the 
economy's  wage-setting  institutions,  which  will vary  from  country 
to  country.  For  Australia,  we  believe  that  a  reasonable  case  can 
be  made that nominal wages are exogenous, in the sense that  they 
are largely  set by the  political  process  (e.g. the present  Prices and 
Incomes  Accord).  This  does  not  mean  that  nominal  wages  will 
never  be  altered  in  response  to  changing  economic  circumstances, 
but it  does mean  there is no automatic tendency  for  nominal  wage 
growth to follow changes in the growth rate  of  the money supply, 
as the quantity theorists would have us believe. 
If  nominal  wage  growth  is  determined  exogenously,  the  question 
of  interest  is  which  of  the  growth  rates  of  money  and  nominal 
wages  gives  superior  information  as  to  the  likely  present  and 
future  paths  of  price  inflation.  If,  for  example,  the  velocity  of 
money  is  highly  variable,  the  growth  rate  of  the  money  supply 
will  not  be  as  good  a  predictor  of  price  inflation  as  the  growth 
rate of  nominal wages.  This will be  particularly  so if  prices in the 
economy are set as markups over costs. 
It  needs  to  be  emphasised  that  the  exogeneity  of  money  is  not 
relevant  here,  and  the  seemingly  endless  debate  about  the 
exogeneity  of  money  only  serves  to  obfuscate  the  important 
 issue^.^  It  seems clear  to  us that,  at  least  under  floating exchange 
rates,  the  (narrowly defined) money  supply is  under  the  potential 
control of  the central bank.  However, the exogeneity  of  money in 
itself  does not  imply  the  existence  of  a  simple  correlation,  i11uch 
less  causation,  between  its  rate  of  growth  and  inflation  of  the 
A  recent  instalment  in  this  debate  is  the  exchange  between  Hendry  and 
Ericsson (1991) and Friedman and Schwartz (1991). price leveL4 
Clearly, these  issues  can  only be  resolved  empirically.  However, 
if  the  quantity  theorists  are  correct,  (5)  is  mis-specified  since  it 
assumes  nominal  wages  growth  to  be  exogenous  and  so  least- 
squares  estimation  of  (5) will  lead  to  be  biased  and  inconsistent 
estimates.  This  problem  is  unlikely  to  be  serious,  however, 
provided  the  growth  rate  of  money  dominates  the  growth  of 
wages  as  a  predictor  of  inflation.  To  see  this,  consider  the 
following  model  of  inflation  which  abstracts  from  the  effects  of 
productivity growth and foreign inflation. 
(6)  and  (7)  both  follow  from  the  assumptions  of  the  quantity 
theory of  money - up to the stochastic shocks LI and v,  the growth 
rates  of  real  wages and the real money supply will be  constant in 
long-run equilibrium. 
.  . 
Noting that  (6) and (7) imply that w = m + v + u, the system can 
be  written as 
A  quantity  theorist  might  contend  that  in  the  long-run  institutions  will 
adapt to make nominal wages  endogenous and that the velocity of  circulation 
will be determined by real factors, such as changes in  transactions technology. 
Ultimately,  money  is  then  the  only  exogenous  nominal  variable  and  so  its 
growth rate must  determine the growth rate of  the economy's  numeraire  i.e. 
money growth must cause price inflation.  However, such a contention would 
be a tautology, not a theory of  inflation. . 
=  (<+z)m  + <(u+v) + v where z = 1 and < = 0. 
.  A 
Since m is exogenous:  the OLS estimate <+z is unbiased. 
A 
However,  < is biased  since 
The  extent  of  the  bias  depends on  the  ratio  o ,/o  ..  This  ratio 
A 
will  be  small  and  so  will  be  close  (but  not  equal)  to  zero 
provided  money  growth  conveys  significantly  more  information 
than nominal wage  growth about inflation,  which  will certainly be  .  . 
the case when m is exogenous and w is endogenous. 
. 
The  case  where both  m  and w  are  exogenous  can be  represented 
by  the model 
where z is a stochastic error term. 
No simultaneity bias arises here; the question of  interest is the 
A 
relative size of  z  and 0.  This is easily resolved by noting that 
Specifically, m is  weakly exogenous i.e. inference for the model's  parameters 
can  be  made  conditionally  on  m  without  loss  of  information.  For  an 
extensive  discussion  of  the  various  types  of  exogeneity  (weak, strong,  strict 
and super), see Engle et al. (1983). and 
Clearly, if  money growth does not  signal much information  about 
inflation  (because  of,  say,  random  shifts  in  velocity)  the 
denominator  of  (11) will be  much  larger  than  the  numerator,  and 
A  z  will  approach  zero.  On the  other  hand,  if  the  growth  rate  of 
nominal  wages  does  not  signal  much  information  about  inflation 
(because,  say,  real  wage  growth  is  determined  by  supply  shocks 
that  have  a  large  variance)  then  the  denominator  of  (12)  will 
dominate the numerator, and 2 will tend to  zero. 
We  conclude that  a regression  equation  such as  (5) will  enable us 
to  determine  which  variables  convey  the  most  information  about 
the  equilibrium  inflation  rate,  irrespective  of  whether  nominal 
wage growth is exogenous or endogenous. 
(ii) Dynamics 
The equilibrium inflation  rate is  that  which is  determined by  long- 
term  fundamentals.  In  the  short-term,  however,  the  presence  of 
imperfectly  competitive  goods  and  factor  markets  -  and  hence 
price  rigidity  -  implies  that  shocks  to  demand  or  supply  which 
change  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate  will  result  in  only  a  partial 
change in the observed inflation  rate.  We capture this inertia with an error-correction model? 
A 
A  is  the  difference  operator, nt is given by  equation  (5) and ut is 
an  i.i.d.  error  which  reflects  shocks  to  the  inflation  rate.  These 
might  include,  inter  alia,  shocks  to  the  price  of  oil  and  terms  of 
trade and cyclical effects on profit margins.  The degree of  inertia 
in the inflation process is determined by the coefficients  P and y. 
The  error-correction  model  (13)  admits  a  number  of  interesting 
special cases: 
(i) P = y = 1, 
A 
which implies  nt = xt + ut.  This is the case  of  no inertia in  the 
inflation  rate.  Up  to  the  error  ut,  inflation  is  always  at  its 
equilibrium rate. 
(ii) p = y = 0, 
which implies nt = x~-~  + ut.  This is the case of  complete inertia, 
with  fundamentals having  no  effect  on  the  inflation  rate,  which 
follows a random walk. 
(iii) p = 0,  y = 1. 
A 
In  this  case,  nt  =  nt-l  +  ut i.e.  the  inflation  rate  is  equal  to  the 
  his  specification can be  derived  as the optimum dynamic adjustment  path 
for  economic  agents  who  minimize  the  discounted  costs  arising  from  the 
deviation of  a variable from its equilibrium value.  See Nickel1  (1985). previous period's  equilibrium rate. 
(iv) p = 1, y = 0, 
A 
which  implies Axt  = Axt  + ut i.e. the  change in the inflation  rate 
is  equal  to  the  change  in  the  equilibrium  rate,  but  the  inflation 
rate itself  need not be  at its equilibrium value. 
3.  TESTING  THE  EXOGENEITY  OF  NOMINAL  WAGE 
GROWTH 
In this section we test for the exogeneity of  nominal wage growth. 
We  do  so  by  reporting,  for  each  country,  the  variance 
decompositions  of  wage  and  money  growth  obtained  from  a 
vector  autoregression  (VAR) estimated over the period  1964-1989.~ 
Consider the  autoregressive process  y,  = b(L)y, + u,.  y  is  an nxl 
vector  of  stationary  variables,  u  is  an  nxl  vector  of  innovations 
(forecast  errors)  and  b(L)  is  an  nxT  matrix  of  autoregressive 
parameters, where L is the lag operator  and T is the lag length of 
the  autoregression.  Wold's  representation  theorem  states  this 
process can be expressed as the vector moving average y,  = a(L)u, 
+  E(u,) where  the  coefficients  of  the  matrix  a(L) are  functions  of 
the estimated  autoregressive parameters  b(L).  a(L) at lag 0 is the 
identity matrix.  Each variable is therefore expressed as the sum of 
current  and  past  innovations  of  all  the  variables  in  the  system. 
The variance decomposition assigns the total variance  of  the k-step 
ahead  forecast  error to  innovations in the variables  of  the system, 
via  the MA representition. 
Because of  data limitations, the estimation period  for New  Zealand  starts in 
1965. The forecast  variance  of  a  variable  which  is  essentially  exogenous 
will  be largely  explicable  by  the  variance  of  its  own innovations.' 
With  little  feedback  to  it  from  the  other  variables,  its  forecast 
variance  will  be  largely  unaffected  by  innovations  to  the  other 
variables. 
For  each  country,  we estimate  a  five  variable  VAR,  the  variables 
being  domestic  price  inflation,  domestic  nominal  wage  inflation, 
world  price  inflation,  money  growth  and  productivity 
Since  a  VAR  is  just  a  set  of  reduced  form  equations,  the 
estimation  results  are  not  open  to  structural  inferences." 
However,  the  ordering  of  the  variables  in  the  VAR  does  impose 
some structure  on  the  contemporaneous  relationships between  the 
variables, which affects the variance decompositions.  We place the 
variables  in  the  following  order:  world  inflation,  productivity 
growth,  money  growth, nominal  wage  growth  and price  inflation. 
This  reflects  our  prior  view  that  world  inflation  is 
contemporaneously  exogenous  to  all  the  other  variables,  world 
inflation  and  productivity  growth  are  together  exogenous  to  the 
remaining  variables  etc.  (Reversing  the  order  of  money  and 
wages does not alter the results in any important way.) 
In Table 1 we report the variance decompositions of  nominal wage 
growth in each country.  Each  entry in Table 1 represents the 
Strictly  speaking,  such  a  variable  will  not  be  Granger  caused  by  other 
variables.  Granger  non-causality  and econometric exogeneity  are related,  but 
distinct,  concepts.  In  general,  Granger  non-causality  neither  implies  nor  is 
implied by  weak  exogeneity.  However,  we show in Appendix  1 that  under 
weak  assumptions Granger non-causality  does imply  weak  exogeneity  in  this 
model. 
Appendix 2 contains details of  data methods and sources. 
lo The estimated VAR  parameters  are available on request. Table 1 
Variance Decomposition of  Nominal Wage Growth 
Percentage of Nominal Wage Growth Explained  by Shock to: 
World  Productivity  Money  Nominal Wage  Inflation 





1  15.9 
2  13.3 
3  28.9 
4  27.5 
5  25.2 
New Zealand 
Year 
1  12.2 
2  8.2 
3  10.0 
4  11.1 
5  11.2 Table 1 (cont.) 
Variance Decomposition of  Wages Growth 
Percentage of  Nominal Wage Growth Explained by Shock to: 
World  Productivity  Money  Nominal Wage  Inflation 
Inflation  Growth  Growth  Growth 
United Kingdom 
Year 
1  11.5 
2  7.5 
3  10.5 
4  13.2 
5  15.2 
United States 
Year 
1  0.2 
2  7.8 
3  11.7 
4  15.8 
proportion  of  nominal  wage  growth,  at  each  time  lag,  associated 
with shocks to  each variable in  the model.  By  construction,  these 
shocks  are  uncorrelated,  so  the  proportions  sum to  100 per  cent. 
We  use two lags of  each variable in each VAR. The  exogenous  nature  of  nominal  wages  in  Australia  is  quite 
apparent, with wage growth explaining  a very large proportion of 
its  own  forecast  variance  i.e.  there  appears  to  relatively  little 
feedback  from the other variables  to  nominal wage inflation,  even 
after  five  years,  although  we  leave  open  the  possibility  that  it 
might  be  affected  by  factors  determined  outside  the  model,  such 
as expected inflation. 
The  results  for  New  Zealand  are  very  similar  to  Australia.  In 
Japan, the United  Kingdom  and the United  States nominal  wages 
also appear to be largely exogenous,  though to a lesser extent than 
Australia  and  New  Zealand,  with  shocks  to  wage  inflation 
explaining  about  half  of  the  forecast  variance  after  3-5  years. 
Unlike  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  however,  innovations  to 
productivity  growth  appear  to  be  important  determinants  of 
nominal  wage  growth  in  these  three  countries,  as  do  shocks  to 
world  inflation.  Interestingly,  and significantly,  shocks  to  inoney 
growth  do  not  appear  to  be  important  determinants  of  wage 
inflation  in  any  country,  except  perhaps  initially  in  the  United 
Kingdom. 
4. SHORT-RUN DETERMINANTS OF  INFLATION 
The  above  results  suggest  a  possibly  significant  role  for  nominal 
wage growth in the determination of  price inflation.  The variance 
decompositions of  inflation,  reported  in Table  2,  confirin  that  this 
is  indeed  the  case.  For  Australia,  well  over  half  the  forecast 
variance  of  inflation  is  explicable by  shocks to  the  growth rate  of 
wages, even after five years.  In contrast, shocks to money growth 
explain  only  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  this  variance.  The 
contributions  of  shocks  to  productivity  growth  to  the  forecast 
variance of  Australian inflation  are negligible,  while  the effects  of Table 2 
Variance Decomposition of  Inflation 
Percentage of  Inflation Explained by  Shock to: 
World  Productivity  Money  Nominal Wage  Inflation 
Inflation  Growth  Growth  Growth 
Australia 
Year 
1  0.1 
2  4.2 
3  6.4 
4  10.6 
5  12.5 
Japan 
Year 
1  1.7 
2  2.5 
3  8.0 
4  8.9 
5  9.2 
New Zealand 
Year 
1  36.3 
2  47.8 
3  54.3 
4  55.7 
5  54.7 Table 2 (cont.) 
Variance Decomposition of  Inflation 
Percentage of  Inflation Explained  by Shock to: 
World  Productivity  Money  Nominal Wage  Inflation 
Inflation  Growth  Growth  Growth 
United Kingdom 
Year 
1  16.4  17.6 
2  8.8  9.7 
3  6.4  21.1 
4  8.5  21.2 
5  13.0  19.8 
United  States 
Year 
1  0.0  0.1 
2  9.4  2.1 
3  14.5  3.9 
4  20.0  6.1 
5  22.0  5.5 
world  inflation  shocks  are  only  modest.  Only  initially  does 
inflation itself  contribute a large proportion  of  its forecast variance, 
indicating  (not  surprisingly)  that  the  inflation  rate  responds 
endogenously  to  other  macroeconomic  variables.  (On  the  other hand,  Fahrer  and Shori  (1990) find  that  inflationary  expectations  in 
Australia  appear to be largely exogenous.) 
The  variance  decompositions for the  other  four countries  indicate 
that  wages  co~~sistently  dominate  money  as  explanators  of 
inflation.  Soine  interesting  cross-country  differences  do however 
arise.  New Zealand  stands out in that world inflation appears to 
be  a  important  determinant  of  its  domestic  inflation,  where  it 
accounts for  about  50  per  cent  of  the  forecast  variance  after  two 
years.  Productivity  growth  plays  a  significant  role  in  Japan and 
the United Kingdom, but not elsewhere. 
5. THE  STRUCTURAL MODEL: ESTIMATION 
The  variance  decompositions  pertain  to  the  deteri~~ination  of 
inflation  in  the  short-run.  In  this  section  we  examine  the 
determinants of  the long-run, equilibrium, inflation rate. 
The  estimating  equation  for  the  stn~ctural  model  of  Section  2  is 
derived by  substituting equation (5) into equation (13): 
Equation  (14) is  non-linear  in the  parameters  P,  y, Lo,  hl,  h2,  % 
and  h4.  There  are  five  such  equations  in  our  model, 
corresponding to  each  of the  five countries that  we examine.  We 
think  it  is  reasonable  to  presume  that  contemporaneous  inflation 
disturbances  could  be  correlated  across  countries  and  so  we 
estimate the model by i~on-linear  Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Table 3 
Parameter Estimates 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Australia  Japan  New  United  United 
Zealand  Kingdom  States 
SC(*) and  HS(')  are  Breusch-Pagan  test  statistics  for  serial 
corr  lation and heteroskedasticity, respectively.  All  are distributed 
as 2(1).  See Appendix 3 for details. The model is estimated using annual data over the period 1964-89. 
The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  3.  They  are  very 
encouragng.  The  fit  of  all  the  equations  is  good;  there  is  no 
evidence  of  any  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals  and  only  for 
Australia  is  there  any  evidence of  heteroskeda~ticit~."  In  general, 
the  estimated  standard  errors  are  small  relative  to  the  coefficient 
estimates.  Very  few  of  the  estimated  parameters have  the  wrong 
sign  and, of  the  ones that  do, none  is  significantly different from 
zero at the one percent level. 
The  estimates  of  y  show  that  in  Japan only  about  30  percent  of 
the  disequilibrium  inflation  is  reflected  in  the  change  in  inflation 
the following year, compared  with  about 50  per cent in Australia, 
60  percent  in  the  United  Kingdom,  80  per  cent  in  the  United 
States and 90  per cent in New Zealand.  The estimates of  P,  which 
indicate  the  proportion  of  the  change  in  the  equilibrium  inflation 
rate  that  is  observed  contemporaneously,  also  vary  markedly 
across  countries.  Here  the  relative  rankings  of  Japan and  New 
Zealand  are  reversed,  with the  greatest  change  occurring  in Japan 
(about 80  percent) and the least change in New  Zealand  (about 50 
percent).  Australia has the median estimate with 63 percent. 
Generally  speaking,  the  overall  degree  of  inflation  inertia  (given 
by  the  sum  of  P  and  y)  does  not  vary  greatly  across  countries. 
However,  the  divergence  of  the  estimated  p's  and  ys indicates 
that  the  nature  of  the  inflation  dynamics  does  vary  across 
countries.  Australian  inflation  displays slightly  more  inertia  than 
-  - - 
" Specifically, at the five per  cent level of  significance, we can reject  the null 
hypothesis  that  the  variance  of  inflation  errors  in  Australia  is  unrelated  to 
predicted  inflation.  However,  since  we  are  conducting  25  tests,  we would 
expect at this level of  significance to  spuriously reject one null hypothesis. the international average, but this difference is not terribly large. 
The  estimated  values  of  the  equilibrium  inflation  parameters  (the 
h's)  show  a  consistent  pattern  across  the  five  countries.  In 
particular,  in  every  country,  nominal  wage  growth  appears to  be 
far  more  important than  the  growth of  money in  determining the 
steady  state  inflation  rate  (h3 >  hl).  In  the  Australian  case,  for 
example,  a  five  percent  increase  in  wage  growth  leads  to  an 
increase  in  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate  of  about  four  per  cent, 
while the  same increase  in  money  growth  leads  to  an  increase  in 
equilibrium inflation of  slightly more than one percent. 
A  determined  quantity  theorist  would  no  doubt  interpret  these 
results  differently,  arguing  that  nominal  wages  are not  exogenous 
and  the  apparent  causation  from wages  to  prices  masks  the  true 
structural  relationship,  which  runs  from  money  to  wages  and 
prices.  While  we do not deny the likelihood that tighter monetary 
policy  will  exert  some  downward  pressure  on  wages  growth, 
either  through  expectations  of  lower  price  inflation  or  through  a 
weaker  labour  market,  we  nevertheless  believe  that  such  an 
argument would be beside the point. 
Our interpretation  of  these  results  is  that  whatever  the  source  of 
any  disinflationary  impulse,  the  response  of  wages  is  of 
paramount  importance  if  inflation is  to be  reduced  on  a sustained 
basis.  In  a  world  where  labour  markets  resemble  the  textbook 
model of  perfect  competition,  a tightening of  monetary policy  will 
almost  certainly  be  accompanied by  a rapid  fall  in  nominal  wage 
growth,  and  concomitantly,  price  inflation.  In  the  real  world 
where  the  nature  and  behaviour  of  labour  market  institutions 
matters,  such  a  response  is  not  guaranteed.  A  tightening  of 
monetary  policy  that  is  not  accompanied  by  a  slowing  of  wage growth will lead to a fall in inflation, but only via  a contractioi~  of 
profit  margins.  This  strategy  might  be  effective  in  the  short-run 
but  is  unlikely  to  prove  an  acceptable  method  of  lowering  the 
inflation rate over a long time horizon. 
The  estimates  of  h4  show  that  increased  productivity  growth 
reduces  inflation,  as  we  would  expect,  but  the  extent  of  this 
reduction  varies  markedly  across  countries.  The  size  of  the 
coefficients  shows,  moreover,  that  the  quantitative  effect  on 
inflation  of  increased  productivity  growth  is likely  to  be  modest. 
For  example,  suppose  that  "microeconomic  reform"  permanently 
increases  the  rate  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  in  Australia 
by  two percentage points per  year, which would seem to  us to be 
the upper  bound  for  what  might  be  achieved.  The  resultant  fall 
in the steady state inflation rate will only be  about one percent. 
The  estimates  of  + show  that  foreign  inflation  (measured  in 
domestic  currency),  in  every  country  except  New  Zealand,  has 
negligible  effects  on  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate.  This  means 
that,  New  Zealand  aside,  foreign  inflation  has  no  explanatory 
power beyond  that of  the other variables. 
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We  see  two  policy  implications  from  the  results  of  this  paper. 
The first is that  the inertia in Australia's  inflation rate implies that 
policy  action which seeks a reduction  in inflation will produce the 
desired  result  only after  a substantial period  of  time.  The  second 
is that nominal wage growth is the principal  determinant  of  price 
inflation  in  Australia.  This  poses  a  dilemma  for  policy  makers. 
The  deregulation  of  the  labour  market,  with  wages  determined 
(perhaps)  on  an  enterprise  by  enterprise  basis,  should  facilitate efficiency-enhancing movements in relative wage levels.  However, 
wages policy, as such, will then cease to exist as an instrument for 
combating inflation. 
We  could  appeal to  the Lucas critique  (Lucas 1976) and assert that 
such  a  major  policy  change will  fundamentally alter  the  structure 
of  the  economy,  rendering  obsolete  both  our  estimated 
relationships  and  the  need  for  a  wages  policy.  However,  this 
remains very much to be  seen.  In  any case, the demise of  wages 
policy  implies that  the  entire burden  of  keeping  the  rate  of  price 
inflation  acceptably  low  will  fall  to  monetary  policy,  whose  role 
shall  then  be  to  deliver  the  correct  anti-inflation  signals  to  price 
and  wage  setters.  This  will  be  a  difficult  assignment  in  an 
economy  where  goods and factor  markets  work  only  imperfectly, 
where  wage  levels  are  set  as  the  result  of  bargaining  outcomes, 
and where prices are set as markups over costs. REFERENCES 
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Council, March. Appendix 1: Granger Causality and Exogeneity 
In  this  appendix  we  demonstrate  that,  under  weak  assumptions, 
Granger  non-causality  implies  weak  exogeneity.  Consider  the 
following structural model of  inflation: 
. 
where a  is  the  rate  of  inflation,  m  is  the  growth  rate  of  money  . 
and  w  is  the  growth  rate  of  nominal  wages.  m  is  weakly  . 
exogenous  (with respect  to  the variables a and w).  w  is  weakly  . 
exogenous if  b2 = b3  = 0.  Conditional on this being  true, w is an  . 
exogenous  determinant  of  a  if  a3  #  0,  while  m  is  an  exogenous 
determinant of  a if  a2 #  0. 
The reduced form of  this system is: m  fails  to  Granger cause w if  b2cl  + b3  = 0.  In  itself, this  does 
not  imply  anything  about  the  exogeneity  of  w.  However,  if  we 
make  the reasonable  assumption  that  cl  > 0,  then  b2cl  + b3  =  0 
implies b2 = b3  = 0 i.e. w is weakly exogenous. 
m  does not  Granger cause x if  a2cl  + a3b2cl  + a3b3  = 0.  Again 
assuming  cl  >  0,  and  conditional  on  the  weak  exogeneity  of  w, 
this  implies  a2  =  0 i.e. m  is  not  an  exogenous  determinant  of  n. 
Finally, w  Granger causes n if  a3bl  #  0.  This implies a3  #  0  i.e. 
w is an exogenous determinant of  x. 
Thus,  the  combination  of  w  Granger  causing  n,  m  not  Granger 
causing w or x,  and the assumption of  cl  > 0  implies that w is an 
exogenous, structural determinant of  x but m is not. 
This  demonstration  can  be  easily  extended  to  more  complicated 
structural models. 
Appendix 2:  Data Methods and Sources 
Methods 
We  use the growth rate of  the GDP deflator as our measure of  the 
inflation  rate.  (For  Japan and  the  US  we  use  the  GNP  Deflator.) 
This  measure  is  affected  less  by  changes  to  indirect  tax  regimes 
and administered  prices  than  the  CPI.  Our measure  of  money  is 
MI,  defined  as  private  non-bank  sector  notes  and  coins  plus 
current deposits.  We  measure wages as an index of  average wage rates. 
Total  factor  productivity  is  defined as the  Solow  residual  from  a 
Cobb-Douglas production  function i.e. 
where z  is total factor  productivity, y is GDP  (GNP), k is the real 
capital  stock,  n  is  total  employment  and  0  is  the  average  profit 
share  for  the  period  1962  -  1989.  (y,  k  and  n  are  measured  as 
natural  logarithms).  Growth  rates  are  denoted by  a  ' above  the 
variable. 
For  each  of  the  five  countries an index  of  world  prices  expressed 
in domestic currency terms was calculated as follows: 
(i) The  GDP  deflator  for  each  country  was rebased  to  a  common 
base  year  of  1985.  A world  price  index  I,,,,  measured  in foreign 
currency prices was calculated as 
where  IUSA,  IJAPAN,  IGER  and  IuK  are  the  rescaled  GDP  (GNP) 
deflators described above. 
I,,  was used as a measure of  world prices  for Australia  and New 
Zealand.  For  each of  the USA,  UK  and Japan a world price index 
was  calculated  as  I,,  excluding  the  respective  domestic 
component. (ii)  Exchange  rates  for  five  currencies  against  the  USD  (the 
Japanese yen (JPY), the Australian dollar  (AUD), the New Zealand 
dollar  (NZD),  the  Deutsche  Mark(DEM)  and  the  Pound  Sterling 
(GBP)) were rescaled to a common base year of  1985. 
An  index  of  the  domestic  price  of  foreign  currency  (FC)  was 
compiled  for  each  of  the  five  countries  under  study.  For 
Australia, the index was computed as 
The NZD index was computed with the  same weights  against the 
same  four  major  currencies.  For  the  USD  price  of  foreign 
currency,  the  index  consisted  of  JPY,  DEM  and GBP  components 
and similarly for  the JPY, DEM  and GBP  indexes. 
(iii)  For  each  country,  an  index  of  world  prices  measured  in 
domestic currency terms was computed by  multiplying the current 
world  price  index  by  the  appropriate  exchange  rate  index.  For 
instance, for Australia,  this index is given by: 
Log  differences  of  Q  were  then  used  as  a  measure  of  world 
inflation in domestic currency. 
Sources 
Real  GDP  (Y):  All  real  GDP  series  taken  from  "Gross 
National/Domes~ic  Product: Volume", in OECD Economic Outlook. Employment  (N):  All  employment  series  are  from  "Total 
Employment" from OECD Economic Outlook. 
Inflation (d:  All  series for inflation  are log differences of  "Deflator 
for GDP at Market  Prices" from OECD Economic Outlook. 
Real  Capital  Stock  (K):  All  series  from  "Capital  Stock" in  OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
Profit  Share  (o):  All  series  from  "Profit  Share"  from  OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
Money  (M): All  series  from  International  Financial  Statistics, line 
34.  The  data  have  been  adjusted  for  breaks  in  the  series  for 
Australia  in  1988, New  Zealand  in  1987 and the United  Kingdom 
in 1987 and 1989. 
Exchange  Rates  (E): All  series  are  period  average  rates  with  the 
US  dollar  from  International  Financial  Statistics, "Market Rate/Par 
or  Central  Rate".  Australia,  UK  and  NZ  data  is  from  line  "ah" 
while data for Germany and Japan are from line "af". 
Wages  (W): The  wages  series  for  the  different  countries  are from 
different sources. 
Australia  :  Index  of  Average  Weekly  Earnings  Series  from  the 
ABS.  Since 1982 the series is all persons while prior  to this date it 
is a male equivalent series. 
Japan: "Monthly Earnings: Manufacturing" index taken from OECD 
Main Economic Indicators. 
LTK,  USA: "Wage Rate" index from OECD Economic Outlook. 
NZ:  "Prevailing  Weekly  Wage  Rates"  index  from  OECD  Main 
Economic Indicators. Appendix 3:  Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity 
In  Table  1,  the  abbreviations  SC(l), SC(2) and  SC(3) refer  to  the 
test  statistics  for  first,  second  and  third  order  serial  correlation 
respectively. 
Stewart  (1986)  outlines  a  Lagrange  Multiplier  test  for  serial 
correlation  in  a  model  which  is linear  in  variables  but  non-linear 
in parameters. 
Consider the model 
where  yt  is  the  dependent  variable,  g  is  the  model  specification 
with  variables  Xt  and parameters b  and ut is the  error  term. The 
estimated  model  vields  a  series  of  parameter  estimates  6  and 
J  I 
A  A 
estimated  errors  ut.  The  individual  error  terms  ut  are 




The  partial  derivatives  of  g  (denoted  g) with  respect  to  each  of 
the  parameters  b  are  calculated  and  evaluated  at  the  parameter 
A  A  A  A 
estimates b.  The auxiliary regression  (a2.2) of  v on g and v  (the  -1 
residual series lagged  j  times) is estimated  to test for  the  presence 
of  serial correlation specifically of  the order j. 
The test  statistic is equal to T.R~  where R2  and T (the number  of 
observations)  refer  to  the  estimation  of  equation  (a3.2). This  test 
2  statistic is distributed as x 34 
The  abbreviations  HS(1)  and  HS(2)  in  table  1 denote  tests  for 
different forms of  heteroskedasticity of  the residuals. 
Stewart  outlines  how  the  Breusch-Pagan  test  can  be  used  to  test 
for  heteroskedasticity  related  to  a time  trend  (HS(1)) or  the  value 
of  predicted  dependent variable (HS(2)). 
A 
Using  the  error  term  series  vt outlined  above,  equation  (a3.3) is 
estimated: 
A 
where  G2  is  the  sample  variance  of  vt,  Zt  is  the  variable 
potentially  related  to  the  heteroskedasticity  of  vt,  KO  and  rl  are 
parameters and ut is an error term.  For  HS(l), Zt is a time trend. 
For  HS(2), Zt  is the  predicted  value  of  dependent variable  in the 
primary estimation (from equation a3.1). 
In  both  cases,  the  test  statistic  is equal  to  T.R~  where  R2  and T 
(the  number  of  observations) refer  to  the  estimation  of  equation 
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